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THE REVIVAL OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING
IN BRITAIN?
Howard Gospel
This article examines the attempt to revive apprenticeship training in
Britain in the 1990s.  Traditionally apprenticeship had been the
main formal method of training for manual workers and the principal
means whereby intermediate skills were formed.  However, from the
late 1960s, apprenticeship training had declined.  During the 1980s
employers did little to sustain apprenticeships, and the Conservative
government was suspicious of a form of training which it associated
with trade unions.  From the early 1980s, there was a growing
discussion as to how far Britain lagged behind major competitors in
terms of skill formation, especially at the intermediate level.  In a
significant change in policy in autumn 1993 the then Conservative
government announced the Modern Apprenticeship.
The first section of the article provides some definitions and a
framework of analysis.  The second section puts apprenticeship
training into an historical and comparative context.  In the next two
sections the design and operation of the Modern Apprenticeship are
considered.  Finally conclusions are drawn and policy implications
are considered.
1. THE ORGANISATION OF TRAINING
Training may be organised in a number of ways.  First, it may be co-
ordinated and financed through the market.  In other words, market
forces of supply and demand determine training decisions, such as
the decision to become or to take on a trainee.  Markets, however,
differ. Some are largely unorganised and competitive in the classical
free market sense.  In these markets, training decisions are mainly
shaped by price signals, and the expectation is that attachment
between trainees, qualified workers, and firms will usually be short
term. Other markets are more structured and regulated.  These
2include occupational labour markets where customary practices and
intermediate institutions, such as trade unions and employers’
associations, regulate market forces (Kerr, 1954).  Here, pure market
forces are more muted; training tends to be in occupational skills
which are usually certified in some way; and mobility takes place
according to the rules of the occupational market.  Second, training
may be co-ordinated more within the organisation.  In other words,
the amount and type of training are determined according to
administrative criteria and needs within the internal labour market of
the firm.  External price signals are less important and the
expectation is that there will be less external mobility (Doeringer
and Piore, 1971).  In this case, training is likely to be more specific
to the interests of the firm.  Third, training may be organised and
funded by the state.  In this case, it may be provided in schools and
colleges and financed to varying degrees by government grants.  Here
training is likely to be of a more general nature and usually needs to
be supplemented by work-based experience.  The degree of state
involvement may differ considerably.  It may be essentially auxiliary
and supportive of market- and firm-based training or more
interventionist and directive in nature.
In practice these three types will often overlap, and there will
usually exist combinations of market-, firm-, and state-based
arrangements.  There are also intermediate forms of training where,
for example, otherwise competing firms may cooperate within a
market to organise training on a multi-employer basis.  As we will
see, each form of training has its costs and benefits.  However, the
equilibrium between different forms is often a difficult one to
maintain:  in particular, highly socially constructed arrangements,
such as occupational labour markets, may be undermined by
growing market forces, by internal company provision, or by
increasing state intervention.
Apprenticeship is here defined as a method of employment and
on-the-job training which involves a set of reciprocal rights and
duties between an employer and a trainee (usually a young person);
the employer agrees to teach a range of skills, usually of a broad
occupational nature; in return the apprentice agrees to work for an
3extended period at a training wage which is low compared to the
qualified worker’s rate, but which rises periodically until the
apprenticeship is completed.  In the early stages, the pay and training
which the young person receives exceeds the contribution to the firm
by way of productive output; in the later stages, the relationship is
reversed.  In this way there is some sharing of the costs of training.
On completion, the skilled worker expects to receive a higher wage
than the non-apprenticed worker, and this constitutes an incentive to
complete the apprenticeship.  For apprenticeship to be viable, the
parties must live up to the terms of the agreement with sufficient
frequency.  In addition to its economic function, apprenticeship
performs a broader function of socialisation into the trade and the
world of work.  In modern times, productive work and on-the-job
training have come to alternate with off-the-job training in an
educational institution often partly financed by the state.
As thus defined, apprenticeship has elements of market-, firm-,
and state-based training.  Thus, market forces play a part in
determining the employer’s decision to take on an apprentice.
Crucially apprenticeship has usually been based on more regulated
markets where intervening institutions shape rules governing the
apprenticeship.  In this respect, the expectation is that the
apprenticeship will involve training in broad skills which are
transferable in the occupational market.  Apprenticeships are usually
served within one firm and so, for a time at least, the apprentice is
part of the firm’s internal labour market.  There may thus be a pull
towards training in firm-specific skills of more immediate advantage
to the employer.  Also, over time, apprenticeships have come to
overlap with state co-ordination of training in a number of ways: 
apprentices may attend colleges for off-the-job training; their
training costs and even wages may be subsidised by the state; and the
form of apprenticeship may be subject to legislative requirements. 
Again it should be stressed that the equilibrium between these
various elements is a difficult one to maintain.  A shift in emphasis
may undermine the balance and change the essential nature of
apprenticeship.
42. BACKGROUND
In the decade or so after the Second World War, apprenticeship still
provided the British economy with an adequate supply of skilled
labour of a reasonable, though also variable, quality (Broadberry
and Wagner, 1996).  In contrast to Germany, however, it had not
extended much beyond traditional areas of male work in
manufacturing and building trades.  As it developed in Britain, it
assumed the following broad characteristics.  It was usually based on
some sort of formal or informal agreement and lasted for a period
ranging up to seven years, reducing to five in the 1950s, and to
between three and five years by the 1960s.  After abuses during the
interwar period, when apprentices were often used as a cheap
labour, the tradition largely prevailed that apprenticeship should
provide training in broad skills which were transferable in the
occupational market.  This suited the apprentice who knew that
there would be wider job opportunities.  It suited the employer who,
in Britain, often still required traditional skills and who needed to
know the currency of skills in the external labour market.  It also
suited the trade unions since a long period of training in all-round
skills (especially when combined with quotas on numbers) restricted
the supply of labour, rendered members mobile, and underpinned
wage rates.  Over time, increasing provision came to be made for
alternating off-the-job training in technical colleges. Allied to this,
apprentices slowly came to receive formal qualifications, in
particular City and Guilds (C&G) or Business and Technology
Education Council (BTEC) certificates.  Regulation through
collective bargaining was either by informal custom and practice at
workplace level or by more formal agreements at industry level,
though these were usually minimal and were not legally binding.
From the early 1960s onwards, there were growing criticisms of
apprenticeship training by employers and policy makers.  The main
charges were that apprenticeship was exclusive in that it was
restricted to young males in certain trades; it involved a large amount
of time-serving and time-wasting rather than training to standards;
5and it perpetuated outdated restrictions and demarcations (Williams,
1963; Donovan, 1968, pp.85-93).  In these circumstances there
began a series of reform initiatives by governments, employers, and
trade unions.  The 1964 Industrial Training Act, and the related
Industrial Training Board (ITB) and levy-grant system, supported
apprenticeship training by seeking to spread the costs more equitably
between employers.  Some ITBs, such as those in engineering and
chemicals, helped reform apprenticeships by developing modular
training, by increasing off-the-job training, and by introducing new
standards to replace time-serving (Senker, 1992, chapter 2; Senker,
1996). 
Though such reforms were implemented through the 1970s and
into the 1980s, progress was uneven between and within industries.
Moreover, there was very little success in extending apprenticeships
to occupations.  In retrospect, an opportunity was probably missed,
and the British system of apprenticeship was not fundamentally
reformed in the way it was in Germany at that period.1   Also, by this
time, in Britain, apprenticeship training was also overtaken by other
major changes.
In the context of rising youth unemployment, governments
introduced a series of new ‘schemes’ to provide training for jobs. 
The most significant of these, introduced in 1983, was Youth
Training (YT).  Under this scheme, trainees were paid a government
allowance and did not necessarily have employed status.  In
retrospect, YT may have spread formal training to many who would
never have done an apprenticeship.  However, the scheme was very
much introduced to alleviate youth unemployment, and much of the
training was to a low level.  As a result it gave state-based schemes a
bad reputation with both young people and employers.  Some firms
which traditionally had apprenticeship programmes replaced these
with cheaper YT trainees.  Others used YT as a screening device and
later upgraded selected trainees to apprenticeship status.  By the late
1980s, approximately two-thirds of first-year apprentices were on
YT (Payne, 1995, p.78).   Simultaneously, therefore, YT both
supported apprenticeships by providing subsidies and undermined
them by providing a state-based alternative (Jones, 1988; Stevens,
61994).
During the 1980s and early 1990s there was a series of other
Conservative government initiatives which had a profound effects on
the system of vocational education and training.  In terms of
education, government sought to encourage vocationalism in schools
and to increase staying on:  the former had limited effect; the latter
contributed to the considerable increase in participation rates (Green
and Steedman, 1996).  In terms of training, most of the tripartite
ITBs and levy arrangements were replaced with a voluntary,
employer-led system of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs),
local groupings of private sector employers, charged with co-
ordinating training and implementing government schemes.  At
sectoral level, Industry Training Organisations (ITOs), again largely
employer-dominated, came to replace the former training boards.  In
line with market-based ideas, measures were introduced to reduce
pay and benefits for young people; private training providers were
encouraged; and credits are given to young people to be exchanged
for approved training.  In a major reform of the qualification system,
from 1986 onwards, a new system of National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQs) was introduced. This created a framework of
standards based on ‘competencies’ or the ability to perform work
tasks.  The intention behind this was to create a nation-wide and
rationalised system of transparent and transferable qualifications,
from level 1 at the bottom up to level 5 (degree level) at the top
(Jessup, 1990; Beaumont, 1995)  According to critics, these have
had a largely negative effect on the quality, and little effect on the
quantity, of training (Smithers, 1993; Robinson, 1996).  In addition,
General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs) were
introduced to provide a vocational alternative to the traditional
academic A levels for those staying on at school.2
7FIGURE 1
Apprentices as a Percentage of Employment
Manufacturing, Engineering, Construction, Services
— - — Construction, ---- Engineering,        Manufacturing, - - -
Services.
Source: DE figures 1964-90; LFS figures 1979-96.  Engineering
covers metal goods, engineering, vehicles.  Manufacturing covers
engineering and other manufacturing.  Services covers distribution,
hotel and catering, transport, communications, banking and finance,
public sector, and other. 
During these years, the decline in apprenticeships, which had
started in the late 1960s, continued.  Figure 1 presents statistics from
the Department of Employment (DE) for 1964-90 and the Labour
Force Survey (LFS) for 1979-96.  The two series are different in that
the former was based on employer-reporting in an administrative
count, while the latter are based on self-definition in a survey.  Both
series have their limitations, especially since the former excluded
8many YT trainees, while the latter has tended to include them and to
overstate numbers.  The most precipitous falls in apprentice ratios
were in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the early and mid-1980s,
and again most dramatically in the early and mid-1990s.  For later
years we also have the Youth Cohort Studies:  these show that the
proportion of 16-18 year olds in apprenticeship fell between 1989
and 1992 from 14 to 9% (Payne 1995, p.3).
There are various explanations for the long-term decline in
apprentice numbers.  On the supply side, it might be argued that
young people have become less willing to start an apprenticeship,
preferring to stay on at school and proceed to college or university.
This would certainly correlate with the large decline in apprentice
numbers in the early 1990s.   However, there is no clear evidence
that apprenticeships became less attractive from the late 1960s
onwards, and it is not the case that all young people wish to stay on
at school or go to university.  On the demand side, it has been
argued that technical change and the contraction of traditional trades
reduced the need for apprentices.  Clearly some trades, for example
in printing, have disappeared or declined.  However, after correcting
for employment within each sector, the decline is still evident.  On
the part of trade unions, it has been suggested that the reduction of
union power and the coverage of collective bargaining removed a
support for apprenticeship training.  This explanation has some
credibility, but again it has problems:  in particular, apprenticeship
decline in Britain does not correlate closely with union decline. 
Unions are important in supporting apprenticeship arrangements,
but, by themselves, they have insufficient power to initiate or sustain
them.  On the part of employers, and more convincingly, it has been
suggested that, from the late 1960s onwards, companies became less
willing to take on apprentices for various reasons.  Given higher
apprentice wages, longer periods of training, and shorter periods of
productive work, the cost of apprenticeships rose (Ryan, 1993).  The
failure thoroughly to reform the system made this form of skill
preparation increasingly unattractive to employers in the context of
changing technologies and markets.  From the mid-1970s, with
growing product market uncertainties and rising levels of
9unemployment, many firms took the short-term option of not
training and recruited labour from the external market.  Where entry
training was unavoidable, some employers looked to informal, in-
house arrangements; others looked to state-sponsored YT schemes. 
In this way, both employer commitment and broad coverage were
attenuated.  Finally, it must be added that, from the early 1980s,
government distrusted apprenticeship training and removed supports
such as the ITB system. Various government reports in the early
1980s stressed the negative aspects of apprenticeship — its
association with craft unions, time-serving, and restrictive labour
practices (Central Policy Review Staff, 1980, pp.17-19; Manpower
Services Commission, 1981).  In this way, free market forces, firm-
based arrangements, and state interventions upset the balance on
which occupationally-based apprenticeships depended.
When viewed comparatively, it is well known that
apprenticeship has remained stronger in Germany and surrounding
countries such as Austria and Switzerland, where it also covers a
wider spread of occupations.  In these countries it is underpinned by
a legal framework and state support, inter-firm regulation through
employers’ organisations and chambers of commerce, and employee
involvement through trade unions and works councils.   It is true
that, in recent years, there have been some pressures on these
arrangements, reflecting rising costs and perceived rigidities in the
eyes of employers and the increasing attractiveness of more academic
routes to young people (Casey, 1991).  However, in the early 1990s,
in Germany, the system still covered around 5% of the labour force.
In Australia, up until recently, apprenticeship has also remained
significant, covering over 2% of the labour force.  Here, it has
traditionally been supported by an industrial relations system which
enshrined legally binding awards throughout a whole industry or
occupation.  By contrast, in Britain, apprentices represent less than
1% of the employed labour force (Gospel, 1994).  Over the years,
various attempts have been made to revive apprenticeship training,
for example in France, Spain, Italy, and the US, where it had also
declined.  However, and ominously for Britain, this has been without
great success (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
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Development, 1994; Finegold, 1993).
This was the context within which, in 1993, the Conservative
government announced a reversal of its attitude to apprenticeship
training and, in a major new initiative, launched the Modern
Apprenticeship.
3. THE DESIGN OF THE MODERN APPRENTICESHIP
The Modern Apprenticeship was designed to incorporate both
traditional and new features.  The term apprenticeship was revived,
since it was thought to have more positive than negative
connotations in the minds of employers and young people.  In
particular it was seen to signify quality training and long-term
commitment.  The main elements of the Modern Apprenticeship, as
developed in various blueprints, contained the following (DE,
various dates).
In the first place, on the lines of traditional apprenticeships, the
design stipulated that there should be a written agreement or
‘pledge’ between the employer and apprentice, specifying rights and
obligations.  This agreement was to incorporate the training to be
provided, qualifications to be attained, and a commitment to
completion.3  As such it was intended to signify a mutual and long-
term pledge to a significant period of training, outlined in a training
plan specifying methods, stages, and outcomes.  The agreement was
to be underwritten by the local TEC, with the requirement that,
should the employer cease trading, the TEC would find alternative
training. A corollary of the employer-based arrangement was that the
young person should have employed status during the
apprenticeship, and this was seen as a way of signalling employer
commitment and a means of attracting young people.  Crucially,
given employed status, the apprentice was to be paid a wage, to be
determined by the employer and young person.
Second, and also fundamental to the design, the Modern
Apprenticeship was linked to an industry-wide framework based on
NVQs.  The proponents saw the movement towards competency-
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attaining as a crucial and efficient way of avoiding time-wasting and
assuring consistent quality outcomes.  Though no time periods were
specified, the expectation was that the average apprenticeship would
last for about three years.  Within the NVQ framework, the training
was to be to level 3, adjudged the equivalent of two A levels.  There
was also a suggestion that some apprenticeships might impart
technician, supervisory, and managerial skills.  To the NVQ target of
task-related competency were added so-called ‘core’ or ‘key’ skills
(numeracy, communication, IT, problem solving, and personal skills
such as teamworking).  These were intended to ensure a broader
educational base for the apprenticeship and might be taken from
GNVQ core skill units. The off-the-job training element was to be
provided by further education colleges and private providers, on a
day- or block-release basis.  It was also envisaged that the training
should provide a foundation for movement between routes and
progression up the NVQ ladder and on to higher education.  In
similarity to traditional apprenticeships, the Modern Apprenticeship
was, therefore, to provide preparation in broad skills capable of
being transferred in the occupational labour market.  In contrast to
the traditional apprenticeship, it was also to provide a broad
educational base and the possibility of movement between routes.
Third, in terms of coverage, the expectation was that most
Modern Apprentices would be 16-17 year olds.  As the design
developed, a so-called ‘Accelerated Modern Apprenticeship’ was
later added for 18-19 year olds who already possessed GNVQs or A
levels, with the expectation that these could achieve level 3 in
eighteen months. Thus, just as Modern Apprentices might move into
higher education, so others might also switch into the programme
from further studies at school or college.  This aspiration for greater
flexibility complemented the emerging notion that there should be
alternative, but inter-linking, pathways within the British system
(Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) 1994).  Also, in terms of
coverage, from the outset, the aim was that the Modern
Apprenticeship should operate in a wider spread of industries and
occupations, beyond those which traditionally had this form of
training.  In this respect the initiative sought to extend
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apprenticeships on the lines of the German system.  In addition, they
were to offer opportunities to females and ethnic minorities who in
the past had not done apprenticeships and who often had inferior
access to training.
Fourth, a fundamental aim was to give ‘ownership’ to industry,
which, in reality, as with other Conservative reforms, meant giving
leadership and control to employers. This was seen as necessary to
establish employer commitment and to avoid the appearance that
this was yet another government scheme for the unemployed.  Thus,
the employer-led ITOs were to design the framework and employer-
led TECs were then to organise delivery at the local level.  Further
education colleges, traditional certifying bodies, and trade unions
were assigned a lesser role.  Within the framework, employers could
adapt programmes to their own particular company circumstances.
Crucially, in terms of financing, the employer would pay the
apprentice’s wage and bear a part of the training cost. 
Finally, though the main costs were to be borne by the
employer, it was announced that government funds were to be made
available to finance the development of the system and to contribute
towards the cost of off-the-job training.  This established the
important principle of state support for part-time education and
training for employed young people.  The funding mechanism was in
part to be via Youth Credits (YCs) which became an integral part of
the proposal.  It was felt that market-exchangeable credits would
boost the motivation of young people to train and the willingness of
employers to take on trainees.  The money was to be channelled
through the TECs which were to agree actual funding levels with the
training provider or employer, thus allowing for local flexibility.
4. MODERN APPRENTICESHIPS IN PRACTICE
To date over 70 sectors (covering the majority of British industry and
commerce) are operating or developing Modern Apprenticeship
programmes.  Some, such as in engineering and electrical
contracting, were able to build on well established arrangements;
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others, such as in retailing, IT, and business administration, had a
bigger task to develop frameworks from scratch or from existing
loose qualifications or from YT arrangements.  In early 1996, the
Accelerated Modern Apprenticeship was merged into the main
programme.  Employers had found two lots of funding arrangements
bureaucratic; there was a concern that a foreshortened programme
would undermine the credibility of the initiative; and, as it turned
out, apprentices were proving to be older than had been anticipated
(Ernst & Young, December 1995). 
It is unclear how much money has been put into the programme
by government and how much is paid out to employers by way of
subsidy for training.  In 1994, it was stated that over £1.35bn would
be made available over 3 years to develop the frameworks and to pay
for off-the-job training.4  Without access to internal data, it is
impossible to say how much new money has been spent, but it is
clear that funding was diverted from other schemes such as YT.  As
to the subsidy to employers, given devolution to TECs, this varies
between localities and occupations.  The Department for Education
and Employment (DfEE) sets target numbers for TECs which in turn
decide how much they will spend on which programmes.  TECs thus
have some latitude as to whether, for example, they seek to fund
more engineering and IT places which may be difficult to fill or more
hairdressing and retailing apprenticeships which may be easier.
Employers would seem to have limited input in this process.  On
average government funding covers about £6,000 per capita of the
average gross cost of £25,000 of a three year apprenticeship
(Financial Times, 24 March 1997).  In other words, it can be as
much as twice the YT subsidy.  However, as we will see below, it
may be insufficient to attract employers in some sectors where the
cost of the off-the-job training is high.
To date, we can draw on a number of surveys which provide a
broad picture of the early Modern Apprenticeships.  These were
commissioned by government and provide a somewhat optimistic
review of developments (Ernst & Young, various dates).
In terms of recruitment, there was some initial fear that young
people would be insufficiently interested because of the stigma of
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government schemes and a growing preference for the school-based
route.  Indeed, in some localities in engineering, it has proved
difficult to fill places.  However, in most cases, it has been relatively
easy to recruit, and the average level of educational attainment of the
early intake has been high and has included many who might have
stayed at school or gone to college.5  However, there has also been
considerable switching from YT, with over 40% having been on that
scheme.  If numbers are to increase in the future, while still
maintaining quality, more will need to be taken from the ‘staying on’
group or the YT group itself will have to be upgraded.  The average
starting age of the Modern Apprentices has been over 17 years,
perhaps reflecting a desire of employers for high educational
standards.  Unfortunately, equal opportunities objectives do not
seem to have been met with only 3% coming from ethnic minorities
and with 39% being female and mainly concentrated in traditional
female jobs.6
In terms of employment status, 95% are employed, with the
main exceptions being in childcare, business administration, and
engineering construction.  Pay has varied from £29.50 (the YT
allowance) to a maximum of £165 a week for some apprentices in
engineering, with the average being £76.  The highest average has
been in engineering (£88) and chemicals (£83) and the lowest in
childcare (£41) and business administration (£45) (Ernst & Young,
February 1995, p.18).  Marsden and Ryan (1995) argued that, as an
incentive to employers, Modern Apprentices should not have
employed status and should be paid a low trainee allowance as in
Germany.  However, in the British context, given the past history of
YT, employee status would seem to be necessary to attract and
retain apprentices.  Certainly the various surveys show that the
absence of employed status was a significant disappointment to
apprentices (Unwin and Wellington, 1996).  As to the wage,
Marsden and Ryan suggested that this should be set somewhere
between the low allowance of YT and the higher wage associated
with some traditional apprenticeships, where a select few could earn
rates exceeding £100 per week.  In their terms, the average would
seem to be about right, though still with some high wages in
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engineering.7
In most firms (82%) there exist formal agreements, with training
plans (74%) outlining stages, off-the-job training, and outcomes
(Ernst & Young, October 1995).  In a few instances, as in some
chemical and engineering companies, off-the-job training involves
the whole of the first year in college, though in these cases the
absence of workplace involvement can be a disappointment to the
young people concerned (Unwin and Wellington).  Unfortunately, it
is not yet possible to say what percentage obtain a permanent job on
completion, either with their employer or with another employer.8
This will clearly be a crucial test of long-term success.
The overall conclusion from these surveys has been that more
than two-thirds of participating employers expressed a willingness to
take on more Modern Apprentices and said they would recommend
the programme to other employers.  In addition, there would seem to
be high levels of satisfaction among apprentices with their
programmes (Ernst & Young, October 1995).  It is necessary,
however, to go beyond these largely optimistic survey results and
consider the quantitative and qualitative outcomes in more detail.
From a quantitative point of view, there are confusions and
contradictions in stated targets and actual numbers on the Modern
Apprenticeship.  It was envisaged that between 60,000 and 70,000
Modern Apprentices would qualify annually.  It was clearly
envisaged that there would be at least 150,000 Modern Apprentices
at any one time.9  Another statement, however, put the target figure
as high as 200,000 (Bayliss, 1994, p.24).  A further stated objective
was, from a 1992-93 base, to treble the number of young people on
government supported training achieving NVQ3 by the end of the
decade.10  While the main objective was to provide skills at the
intermediate level, other more ambitious aims were expressed in
terms of providing technician, management, and entrepreneurial
skills (DE, Insight, 29 and 30, Spring and Summer 1994; DTI, 1994,
p.39).
In practice, the figures in Table 1 suggest a more mixed
outcome.  Up to March 1997, there had been 93,500 Modern
Apprentice starts in England.  On this basis and given a drop-out rate
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of 15%, it will take until the turn of the century before the stock
target is reached.  If reference is made to Figure 1, the beginning of
the Modern Apprenticeship has not arrested the fall in apprentice
numbers.  As already suggested, a significant proportion of Modern
Apprentices have switched from YT places, as is shown by the
falling proportion of the 16-18 age group on YT since the launch of
the Modern Apprenticeship.11  A breakdown by sector reveals some
further problems.  Over half of all Modern Apprentices are in
traditional sectors — engineering (19.4%), construction and
electrical contracting (14.3%), vehicle repair (8.5%), and
hairdressing (7.6%).  The only large new sectors are business
administration (14%), retailing (7.4%), health, social, and child care
(7.2%), and hotel and catering (6.3%).  Disappointing must be
sectors like IT (1.4%), chemicals and related (0.8%), textiles and
clothing (0.3%), and telecommunications (0.1%) — though some of
these would claim that their programmes are very new.12
TABLE 1
Modern Apprentice, Total Starts, England, to end October 1996
Total Starts Per Cent
Accounting 1206 2.1
Agriculture 558 1.0
Air transport 132 0.2
Bus & coach 170 0.3
Business administration 8121 14.0
Chemicals, polymers 481 0.8
Construction 5231 9.0
Electrical Installation 3071 5.3
Electricity 110 0.2
Engineering 11233 19.4
Steel 100 0.2
Hairdressing 4430 7.6
Estate agents 151 0.3
Health, social, child care 4162 7.2
Hotel & catering 3626 6.3
Information technology 838 1.4
Motor industry 4927 8.5
Road haulage 121 0.2
Printing 525 0.9
17
Furniture 169 0.3
Retailing 4298 7.4
Travel 872 1.5
Textiles & clothing 180 0.3
Sports & recreation 389 0.7
Others (38 industries) 2849 4.9
Total starts (71 industries) 57,934 100
Source: DfEE, December 1995 and September 1996.  Engineering
covers engineering manufacturing, marine, and services; construction
covers building, engineering construction, plumbing.
Some firms have used the Modern Apprenticeship to re-enter
apprenticeship training; others have used it to introduce
apprenticeship for the first time.  However, many firms have merely
substituted Modern Apprentices for apprentice places they would
have funded themselves anyway or which would have been
supported in the first two years by YT.  In engineering, for example,
leading firms such as Ford, Rover, Rolls Royce, and British
Aerospace had apprentice schemes and renamed as many as they
could on such programmes as Modern Apprentices.  Similarly, in
construction, many employers who funded the first two years of
training under YT have now moved to the Modern Apprenticeship or
switched YT trainees on to it.  It is a concern that an unknown (but
probably significant) number of apprentices should be of this kind. 
Overall, by the turn of the century, apprentices (Modern and
otherwise) will probably constitute only around 10% of the 16-18
cohort, in effect little or no increase over a 1992-93 base.13
In terms of qualification outputs, some tentative conclusions
may be drawn.  In the past, some traditional apprenticeships had
only reached the equivalent of NVQ level 2 and only 11% of YT
leavers had attained NVQ level 3 or 4 (Robinson 1996, p.19).
Moreover, the prototype surveys showed that 58% of participating
employers had not in the previous year trained young people to
NVQ level 3 or its equivalent (Ernst & Young, October 1995).  The
Modern Apprenticeship may therefore raise the level of
qualifications and it adds new ‘key’ skills to apprenticeship
programmes.  However, given the numbers cited above, it is unlikely
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to treble the numbers gaining qualifications at level 3 by the turn of
the century.  It is even less likely to have a significant effect on
higher level technician and supervisory skills at level 4.
From a qualitative point of view, there are also mixed
conclusions.  Undoubtedly, the Conservative government saw the
Modern Apprenticeship as a major qualitative initiative and a
reestablishment of the ‘gold standard’ of work-based training in
Britain (DE, Employment Gazette, April 1994, p.99).
On the plus side, as already stated, the new apprenticeship has
obviously established credibility with young people and the
educational attainment of the early intake has been good.  As to the
content of training, the introduction of the Modern Apprenticeship,
with associated NVQs, has given some industries an opportunity to
re-think the content of youth training.  Of course, in some sectors,
this has meant building on firm foundations.  For example, in
chemicals, training to standards, multi-skilling, and greater
integration with further education had been introduced in the 1980s.
 In the travel sector, the industry had already developed new
arrangements in the early 1990s.  By contrast, in other sectors, there
has also been an upgrading and extension of training along with the
move to Modern Apprenticeship.  For example, in IT and retailing,
new frameworks have been constructed.  In addition, the emphasis
on more standardised systems may have led to greater transparency
and transferability.  In this respect, the Modern Apprenticeship is
better than informal on-the-job upgrading which is uncertified,
difficult to transfer, and likely to lead to a waste of skills (Marsden,
1995).  It is also an improvement on some traditional
apprenticeships where levels and outcomes could vary considerably
(— though, as we will see, the Modern Apprenticeship may also
allow considerable variation).  The new apprenticeship may also be
positive in that it provides a stepping stone and basis for further
training.  For example, it is being used in this way in retailing where
some large supermarkets, such as Sainsburys, are using it for
progression to management positions (Industrial Relations Services,
June/July 1995).  At Rover, the Modern Apprenticeship offers the
possibility of switching between craft, technician, and student
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schemes in a way which was not possible under traditional
apprenticeships (Huddleston, 1996).14
On the debit side, there are criticisms of the quality of training,
related primarily to the NVQ framework, the quality of trainers and
assessors, and the funding arrangements.  First, it has been claimed
that the NVQ approach stresses the ability to perform a set of tasks
at a given point in time rather than a fuller understanding of the
context of the trade and its broader theoretical underpinning
(Smithers, 1993; Senker, 1996).  Second,  it has also been argued
that national competency frameworks cannot take account of the
variability of contexts in which tasks are performed, except by
becoming increasingly abstract and complex (Wolf, 1994).  This in
turn makes the framework less and less intelligible to employers who
then lose confidence.  Third, there are problems in terms of tuition
and assessment and therefore of quality assurance with the present
system. In most British firms there does not exist the class of
experienced trainers and Meisters who, for example, are a key part of
the German system.  Fourth, testing relies extensively on the
assessment of practical work, carried out mainly by internal
assessors, though subject to having been certified and subject to
standards set by the ITO concerned.  Such assessors, however, may
not be well qualified to assess key skills and, moreover, may be
inclined to push their own trainees through.  This may then result in
outcomes varying from company to company.  As a consequence,
the consistency and transparency problems of the old system may
persist.  Finally, the funding regime is also problematic.  Funding for
off-the-job training is output-related in that trainers receive payment
on attainment of competency by trainees.  This creates a moral
hazard problem in that it provides an incentive to permit sub-
standard candidates to progress (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 1995).
In the light of these criticisms, changes and adaptations have
been made by government and employers.  In an attempt to increase
the broader educational base of the Modern Apprenticeship, so-
called ‘key’ skills were included to provide broader theoretical
underpinnings and understandings.  However, there is great variety in
how these are delivered and whether they are certificated; there is
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also concern among employers with the size and funding of this
component.  Belated attempts have also been made to simplify and
improve assessment of NVQs and key skills with more rigorous
external testing.  Faced with deficiencies in content, firms have also
been adapting the frameworks in various ways to make them more
relevant to themselves and also sometimes more demanding.  Thus,
for example, Ford requires a broader content to ensure standards and
multi-skilling (— unlike most firms, it has also retained a 4-year
time-based format and also guarantees a job on completion (People
Management 23 March 1995:35).  A number of sectors, such as
engineering, chemicals, and bus maintenance, have maintained
traditional qualifications such as C&G or BTEC alongside NVQs to
ensure that knowledge and understanding are sufficiently wide.  In
electrical contracting, the industry has insisted on the continuation
of C&G and its own testing standards.  In other cases, adaptations
may be less benign and may result in downward variability and
reduced transparency.  In hotel and catering, for example, the NVQ
system has been simplified to allow freedom for employers to adapt
the programme to meet their requirements, and big firms tend to take
a pick and match approach (Personnel Today, 14.3.1995; Training,
October 95, p.4).
5. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
The Modern Apprenticeship is a major attempt to revive the
occupational labour market route to vocational education and
training for intermediate skills in Britain.  It is also an attempt to
extend this system of alternating employment-based experience and
vocational education into new areas. To assess its broader
significance and likelihood of success, it is useful to revert to the
three-fold typology set out in the introduction and to return to the
broader historical and comparative context.
The occupational labour market route, with apprenticeship at
its core, has certain advantages over both the firm-based and the
state- or school-based routes.  In comparison to the former,
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apprenticeship offers the prospect of training in broad skills and the
possibility of greater transferability.  This in turn may produce a
better allocation of skills in the economy and less wastage of skills
when people move between jobs.  It is true that internal labour
market provision may encourage firms to invest more in the skills of
insiders, since returns on training are less risky and skill formation
can be integrated into the firm’s human resource planning (Sako,
1991).  However, internalised systems are exclusive of outsiders and
may produce largely firm-specific skills.  Where internalisation is
uneven in coverage, as in Britain, it may create high-skilled islands
within a low-skilled sea and fail to produce a positive effect on
training levels throughout the economy (Marsden and Ryan, 1991;
Gospel, 1992, pp.156-8).
In terms of the school- or university-based route, it is
sometimes suggested that, as a result of higher participation rates
(with nearly two-thirds of 16-18 year olds now in full-time
education and one-third proceeding to higher education), Britain has
already gone down a state-based route to vocational education
(Green and Steedman, 1996; Soskice, 1993).  Further, it could be
argued that this route offers the prospect of more equal access, better
long-term national co-ordination, and broader training in numeracy,
languages, and computing skills.  However, the argument that Britain
should go further down this route and that school, college, and
university graduates should provide intermediate skills is ill-
conceived for a number of reasons.  First, there is a sizeable
proportion of the youth cohort who do not wish to follow the
classroom route.  These need to be trained in those intermediate
skills which are essential for a successful modern economy.  Second,
British schools, colleges, and universities are ill-equipped with staff
and facilities to produce such skills, and this route cannot give the
experience which is necessary for their acquisition.  Third, such an
approach removes the responsibility for training too far from the
workplace and puts it in the hands of government which has other
goals and calls on resources which may complicate training policy.
The occupational labour market route which the Modern
Apprenticeship is attempting to re-create and extend has some real
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advantages.  It facilitates employer investment in potentially mobile
trainees; it gives the responsibility for training to employers who
should be well placed to assess relevant needs; and it is potentially
flexible and responsive to market forces.  It can provide training in
all-round, portable skills, broadly oriented to technical change and
in this sense is superior to YT (and to National Traineeships as this is
to become).  In turn the Modern Apprenticeship has potential
advantages over traditional apprenticeships: it is less restricted by
trade demarcations; it covers a broader spread of occupations; and it
takes a more dynamic view of movement in to apprenticeship and
progression out to continuing training and further education. 
On the other hand, apprenticeship training has real costs for the
employer.  There is a payroll cost in terms of the gap between
apprentice wages and their output and qualified workers’ wages and
their output.  If under the Modern Apprenticeship, the period of
productive work decreases, the cost to the employer will rise. There
is also a tuition cost, which the Modern Apprenticeship reduces via
the subsidy for off-the-job training.  However, if the quantity and
quality of training increases, this will not cover all the costs of off-
the-job training.  In addition, there are further costs in terms of on-
the-job training, re-scheduling work, and time spent by skilled
workers giving tuition.  The opportunity cost of apprenticeship
training lies in the fact that the employer might have recruited
qualified labour in the external market and used resources for other
investments such as in plant and equipment.  The replacement cost is
the cost of losing an apprentice to another employer who has not
trained and who can therefore afford to pay a higher wage which
must then be matched.  Of course, these costs have to be offset
against the cost of not training and recruiting from the external
market.  However, there are usually significant net costs of
apprenticeship training.15  The consequent danger is that the
occupational labour market route will either succumb to external
market strategies or to an unbalanced mixture of free markets,
internal labour markets, and state provision.  In turn, this can have
significant negative consequences in terms of the quantity and
quality of training. At the macro-economic level this can then lead to
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bottlenecks in production and the bidding-up of wages, followed by
deflationary policies such as has occurred periodically in Britain.
In the case of the Modern Apprenticeship, there are real
strengths in its design — apprentice agreements, extension to new
occupations, potentially greater transparency and transferability.
There are also some promising indications as to its operation,
especially credibility with young people.  Some significant supports
are also in place such as the TECs, industry frameworks, and state
subsidy for off-the-job training.  However, as we have seen, there are
also real weaknesses; on the quantitative side these relate to up-take
by employers, concentration in particular sectors, and numbers
covered (— the Modern Apprenticeship only covers an elite of the
employed 16-19 year old population); on the qualitative side these
relate to the nature of qualifications and certification and to
comparability of standards within and between sectors.  These
weaknesses are part of a broader problem of market failure and
missing institutional links.
One of the main problems in terms of market failure lies with
employers, since there are insufficient companies offering good
quality apprentice places.  For employers, the problems are the
interrelated ones of high cost and free-riding.  Even with government
credits for off-the-job training, the costs of apprenticeship to the
employer are not insignificant, especially in sectors such as
engineering and chemicals where apprentice wages and training costs
are high.16  They are especially high when there is pressure to make
skills more transparent and transferable, as is intended with the
Modern Apprenticeship, since this increases the risk of poaching.  As
a consequence, there is a disincentive to take on apprentices and an
incentive to make their training less transparent and more firm-
specific, thus undermining occupational labour markets (Katz and
Ziderman, 1990).  Put another way, the problem is one of cost-
sharing. Investment in general and transferable skills requires an
element of cost-sharing between employers and trainees (Stevens,
1994).  There are, however, limits to which the costs can be shared
with the apprentice via lower wages and more productive work and
yet still attract good candidates and provide quality training.   Costs
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could be shared more with the state via greater or more targeted
assistance for the training or subsidy for the wage element. 
However, there are limits to which costs can be shared with the state
and yet retain an industry-based system.  The costs must therefore be
shared more between a larger number of employers.  If all or most
employers share the costs of training, then no one employer need
fear being at a competitive disadvantage.  However, in Britain, the
mechanisms for such cost and risk sharing between employers are
inadequate.
In countries where apprentice training is still strong such as
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and to some degree Australia, there
are arrangements which have supported the system and helped share
the costs.  Crucial here are various forms of interfirm organisation
and industry-wide arrangements.  In Germany, local Chambers of
Commerce and sectoral employers’ organisations introduce an
element of common purpose and pressure to support training and
prevent free-riding.  In Australia, industry-wide legally binding
determination of wages and conditions also traditionally helped
regulate apprenticeship training.  By contrast, in Britain, the
influence of employers’ associations and interfirm training
arrangements has declined over the last 20 years.  Local TECs and
industry ITOs (now to be called National Training Organisations) are
in part an attempt to remedy this. However, their activities need to
be better coordinated, and there may be a case for TECs merging
with local Chambers of Commerce to provide a firmer foundation
(Bennett, 1994; Marsden, 1995, p.109).  To date, these various
organisations have varied greatly in their ability to build multi-
employer networks to support training.
Employee organisations have been little involved in the
Modern Apprenticeship compared to the role they have played in
Germany in constructing and enforcing that country’s regulatory
framework.  The TUC welcomed the Modern Apprenticeship and
some unions were involved in drawing up frameworks, especially in
engineering, electrical contracting, printing, steel, and merchant
shipping.  Other unions, however, have felt insufficiently involved in
the creation and running of the system.  As has often been the case
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in Britain, it is at workplace level that union involvement in
monitoring and regulating arrangements has been least (Heyes, 1993;
TUC, 1995).  By contrast, in Germany, employee involvement plays
a crucial role: at national level, unions participate in constructing
apprentice arrangements and standards; at workplace level, statutory
works councils monitor the application of apprenticeship rules.  In
the British context, this raises the policy question for management
and government as to whether employee representatives should have
the right to participate in, and agree, to company training
arrangements.
In countries where apprentice training is strong, the state also
plays a more central role, not as a provider of training schemes, but
in ensuring an adequate legal and regulatory framework.  In Britain,
apprenticeship training in the modern era has never had legal
support, and in the 1980s statutory institutions such as ITBs were
also removed.  But, where regulation by employers’ organisations
and trade unions is weak, there may have to be more legal
underpinnings either obliging firms to train or to share costs.  Of
course, attempts to share costs and prevent free-riding were tried
under the levy-grant system.  At the time, this was criticised by
employers as bureaucratic and involving high administrative costs. 
Others have contended that it was given insufficient time to work
and was undermined with the introduction of exemptions and
changed government policies (Senker, 1992).  At the present time, a
return to such an approach does not have much appeal to employers
or politicians.  However, as the story of the Modern Apprenticeship
suggests, it remains difficult to make an employer-led, laissez-faire
approach succeed.
In conclusion, there are problems and contradictions in the
design and operation of the Modern Apprenticeship.  These are
manifested in both the quantity of apprentices and the quality of
training.  On the other hand, there are some positive features and
some signs that the programme is working.  A good apprenticeship
system has much to commend it where school- and college-based
vocational education is inappropriate and where internal labour
market provision is uneven.  The Modern Apprenticeship is probably
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the last opportunity in Britain to revive the employment-based route
to training and to create effective occupational labour markets for
many intermediate skills.  It would be a great shame if this were to
be a missed opportunity.
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ENDNOTES
1 In West Germany, the 1969 Vocational Training Act
(Berufsbildungsgesetz) reformed and extended the national
framework and sought to upgrade training standards.
2 In fact, these already existed in the form of BTEC and other
qualifications and these performed well.
3 Less explicitly, it might also state the employer’s commitment
to helping the apprentice find permanent employment, after
successful completion and where a job was available.
4 This was for both the Modern and the Accelerated
Apprenticeship (Insight, 29, Spring 1994).
5 50% on the prototypes had 5 or more GCSE passes at C or
above (compared to the national average of 43%) and 12% had
completed an A level course. The good quality has been
despite some feeling that schools (whose own funding is based
on numbers staying on) may have discouraged those interested
in this new work-based route.
6 Figures from MA Database.
7 The engineering average of £88 is lower than the average
£107.12 for apprentices aged 16 to 19 as reported by the LFS.
The lower amount for Modern Apprentices may reflect a lower
age range and the fact that LFS apprentices are self-defined.
8 Initially at least, this should be high given the fact that the
Modern Apprenticeship has been launched during a period of
economic upswing.
9 As the Minister at the time rather unfortunately claimed, ‘With
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a crew of 150,000 Modern Apprentices, and government and
employers on the bridge, Great Britain PLC will be on its way
to a highly successful modern economy.’ (DE, Education,
April 1994, p.246; DE, Insight, 30, Summer 1994).
10 This base was 7% of YT leavers attaining level 3 or 4
(Robinson, 1996, p.19).
11 The fall has been from 11 to 10%.  DfEE, Education Statistics
(1996, p.44).  On the plus side, it would appear that the drop-
out rate of 15% is better than on traditional apprenticeships
where it is about 20 to 25%.  The drop-out rate on YT is even
higher.  (Payne, 1995, pp.51-52).
12 A more detailed analysis shows some surprising geographical
distributions.  Thus, Kent had 63% of its total in hairdressing
while its neighbour Essex had none; Tyneside had 47% in
retailing while its neighbour Teeside had only 7% (Observer 16
June 1996, citing unpublished operational DfEE data).
13 In Spring 1992, the Youth Cohort Study showed that 10% of
16-18 year olds were on apprenticeships, two-thirds within the
YT framework. This would total about 130,000.  A target stock
of 150,000 Modern Apprentices, with around 30% of them
likely to be 19 or older, would constitute less than 10% of the
16-18 year old cohort.  See also Payne, 1995.
14 On the plus side, in engineering, a so-called all-age model has
been constructed which allows the framework to be used for
retraining and further training of older workers. 
15 For estimates of the cost of training to apprentice level see
Jones (1986) and  Hogarth et al, (1996).
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16 Ibid.
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